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l1N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN S. SCOTT and ANN B. 
SCOTT, his wife, and 
:B_,RANK H. BJORNDAL and 
AUDREY K. BJORNDAL, 
his wife, 
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WlLFORD HANSEN and VIOLA 
L. HANSEN, his wife; CECIL 
HANSEN and LaDONNA HANSJ!JN, 
his wife; MARJORIE BAKER; 
DARRELL A. TATE; BARBARA 
BUCKLEY and MICHAEL S. 
TATE, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CAcSE 
Case No. 
10580 
This is a quiet title action between adjoining land 
owners arising out of a conflict between Respondents' 
metes and bounds description and Appellants' descrip-
tion according to a monument. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted judgment quieting title 
in the Respondents based on a finding of payment of 
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2 
taxes and possession of the property in question under 
a 1935 court decree awarding said property to Respon-
dents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment quieting title to the property in dispute in them as 
a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With one exception, the facts herein are largely 
stipulated and are not in dispute. The appellants are own-
ers of land in Salt Lake County. (R. 33). Substantially 
all of this property, and all of the property in dispute, 
was owned prior to December 17, 1906, by one Maggie 
B. Thompson. ( R. -!-!--!5). (Ex. P-5). The Appellants' 
predecessors in interest obtained their deed on December 
17, 1906. ( R. -!-! ) . This deed awarded certain properties 
bounded on the north by the south line of a county road. 
(Ex. P-2). 
The Respondent's predecessors in interest acquired 
their deed from l\Iaggie B. Thompson in 1913. (Ex. 
P-5). The latter deed awarded certain properties 
bounded on the south by the south line of the same county 
road. (Ex. P-5). Hespondents' property has been 
fenced for over 40 years alo·ng the north line of the 
county road. (R G3). Respondents never occupied 
any land south of the road. (R. 5-!). 
The legal description of the boundary in controversy 
as conveyed by Maggie Thompson to both Appellants' 
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and Respondents' precedessors was substantially as 
follows: 
'' ... along the south side of the County Road 
thence westerly along the south side of said roa:d 
80 rods, more or less, to a point on the west line 
of said quarter section due so.uth from the point 
of beginning ... this deed is made subject to the 
use of the above mentioned County Road by the 
public as said road is now located." (Emphasis 
supplied) (Exhibit P-5) (R. 64). 
Appellants' property south of the road has been 
fenced in places to prevent dumping of trash and in ad-
dition "no dumping" signs have been placed in strategic 
locations on this property by Appellants. (R. -1:6). 
The property south of the road has not been fanned 
while the property of Respondents north of the road 
has been used for fanning purposes. (R. 5-1:). 
The road in question is maintained by the county. 
( R. 43). lt is the only road that has ever divided 
the property of the parties and has been in existence 
for many years. R. 38). Certain incomplete county 
surveys indicate that the road in question proceeds 
in a straight line between the properties owned by the 
Appellants and those owned by the Respondents. (Ex. 
D-8). However, the true facts as revealed in the 
trial below indicate that the road is not a straight 
road but rather follows a meandering course commenc-
ing and ending at the boundary line between the prop-
erties but extending in a northerly direction into prop-
erties owned by Respondents. (Ex. 1). This road 
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is a public road and is used by anyone desiring to travel 
onto Danish rnad and is (•xten:,;iwly usPd by many resi-
dents of the arPa and has !wen for over 10 and probably 
over 50 years. ( R ~18, 54). 
In the year 1935, the estate of Respondents' pre-
decessor in interest, Andrew Hansen, Jr., was probated 
and the property decedent had acquired in 1913 was 
distributed to Respondents. ( R. 59). The decree 
awarding such property did not adopt the south boun-
dary description wntained in the deed whereby Andrew 
Hansen, Jr., acquired the property. Instead it purported 
to distribute more property than was acquired by An-
drew Hansen, Jr., by establishing a metes and bounds 
description for the south boundary of the property. 
(Ex. P-2). This description did not follow the south 
line of the county rnad but rather cut straight across 
the top of the Appellants' property, severing a sub-
stantial portion of land lying between this line and the 
actual course of the road. 
Tax notices containing the description set forth 
in the 1906 deed have been sent to Appellants and their 
predecessors. Appellants have paid taxes on the prop-
erty according to this description since acquiring the 
property in 1953. (Ex. P-G) (R. -1:8). In addition, Appel-
lants acquired tax title to the property from Salt Lake 
Countv by deed in 1958. (Ex. P-2). 
Appellants disagree with the findings of the Lower 
Court that Respondents have been in possession of the 
property in controversy since 1935. The evidence re-
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garding actual possession is to the contrary. Mr. Wilford 
Hansen, one of the Respondmts, testified that he had 
f<mced the southern boundary of his property along the 
north edge of the county road and had never attempted 
to farm or otherwise use the pro1wrty south of the county 
road. (R. 54). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS HA VE FEE TITLE TO AND POSSES-
SION OF THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY 
Appellants or their predecessors hold title to the 
property in controversy under a warranty deed from 
one Maggie B. ·Thompson, acquired in 1906. Respon-
dents and their predecessors also acquired title to the 
property north of that obtained by Appellants from 
Maggie B. Thompson in 1913. The boundary line be-
tween the properties in both cases was established by 
Mrs. Thompson as the south line of the county road 
then dividing the pro.perties. 
This county road served as a boundary line be-
tween the properties conveyed by Mrs. Thompson until 
the death of Andrew Hansen, Jr., in 1935. For all prac-
tical purposes the road has been the boundary line 
ever since. 
However in 1935, in a decree of distribution entered 
m the probate of the Andrew Hansen, Jr., estate, the 
court ordered that the south boundary of decedent's 
property be fixed by a metes and bounds description. 
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This description did not follow the south line of the 
county road but rather followed a straight line course 
across the property of Appellants' predecessors in in-
terest creating an interlock between the boundaries 
contained in the decree on the south and the north 
boundary of Appellants' property as marked by the 
county road. At the time of the decree no one was aware 
that this interlock or overlap existed. 
The effect of the 1935 decree was not to deprive 
Appellants' predecessors of their previously acquired 
fee title, but rather, in addition, to give Respondents 
color of title to the interlocked property. 
The Lower Court's decisio.n was apparently based 
on the payment of taxes coupled with constructive po~­
session under a claim of right or color of title by Re-
spondents. Such a decision would have perhaps been 
proper were this an ordinary adverse possessio·n case 
where Respondents had actual possession of the prop-
erty in question and had received such possession from 
Appellants. 
But in this case, certain essential elements are lack-
ing which effectively prevent Hespondents' color of title 
from being converted into title through adverse posses-
sion as against the fee title in A1Jpellants. 'l'he Lower 
iCourt neglected to determine who had superior title to 
the overlapping portions of the interlock. 
As a general rule it is true that possession of a 
part of a tract of property under color of title gives rise 
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to constructive possession of the entire tract commen-
surate with the description in the instrument establish-
ing color of title. See 3 Am J ur 2d, Adverse Posses-
sion, ~ 27. 
ln addition 78-12-7, U.C.A., 1953, provides as 
follows: 
"In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof, the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to be possessed thereof within the time 
required by law; and the occupation of the prop-
erty by any other person shall be deemed to have 
been under an insubordination to the legal title, 
unless it appears the property has been held and 
possessed adversely to such legal title for 7 years 
before the commencement of the action." 
Apparently the Lower Court concluded that pos-
session of the property was to be presumed in the Re-
spondents because of this statute and the general rule 
previously quoted. 
However, where two conflicting parties both have 
legal title to the property, Section 78-12-7 is not appli-
cable. And color of title in itself is not capable of creating 
implied possession without actual entry on and occupancy 
of the land in question. Kentucky Coal and Timber De-
velopment Co. v. Kentucky Union Co., 214 F. 590; French 
i:. Hillman, 216 F. supp 117, affirmed 331 F. 2d 305; 
State v. Stockdale, 34 Wash 2d 857, 210 P 2d 686. There 
can be no concurrent seisin of land under conflicting 
claims of right, and the person with the best title will 
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be deemed to be in pOSSl'SSion of the IJl'OlH'rlY in case of 
controversy. 3 Am .Jur 2d, AdvPl'Sl' PossPssion, § 53. 
\Vhere an instrument pmporting to give title cli~­
regards a previously Pstablished bou11dary lim·, ('l'OSsing 
over it and including other prnperties so as to creat~ 
an overlap, there must be actual lJOs::-;ession of the inter-
lock or ow·rlap by the color of title claimant in order for 
his possession to be deemed eo-(•:densive with his des-
cribed boundary w1H·reby the interlock came into exis-
tence. See Illinois Central R. Cu. 1:. Taylor, 1G4 Ky 150, 
175 SW 2G; Bmdtl ·c. Slwrl,:cy, 38 Or. 153, 113 Pac. (j53. 
'l'herefore where the true O\nwr or superior dairn-
ant of a parcel of land on which a color of title overlaps 
or into which a color of title extc>nds, is in possession of 
his land, and the claimant never takes possession o.f the 
portion in controversy but only oecupies some other por-
tion within his described boundaries, the possession of 
the orginal owner and foe title owner remains intact 
and is not displaeed by claimant's possession. The legal 
title carriC's poss(~ssion of the overlapping portion with 
it in such a situation. See 2 C.J S, ~\dwrse Possession, 
§198; Hw1r;er 1.:. Grimm, 142 Ua., 4-18, 83 SE 200; 23 
1f arvard Law HPvie\\' 5(); G Col urnbia Law He view 582. 
The case of Ho1rard v. Sta11olind Oil and Gas Co., 
197 Okl. 2G9, 169 P. 2d 737, is pertinent. There plaintiffs 
c·lairn('(l tit!(' to entain pro1wrtit•::-; both und('r a void eon-
tract of sale and an oral promist~ to conYey a quarter 
section of land. Plaintiffs' predceessors in interest en-
tered into possession of the land withont securing a valid 
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('tJllVl')"ancl' and continu('d Ill po:-;:-;e:-;:-;ion during the life-
time of their grantors. 
During this rwriod one of the allegl'd grantors ex-
(•c·ute<l fivP lllineral d(•(•cb to <ld'endanb' predecessors in 
intt>rest. 
The lJlaintiffs eontended that even if the mineral 
ch•eds wen~ valid the title should be quil'ted in them be-
eause they had acquin·d it by adverse possession, having 
had o-pen and notorious possession of the property for the 
statutory period. 'rhe court in 4uieting title in defen-
dants replit•d to this contention: 
"Adven;e possession m order to npen into 
title must be exclusive. 'Exclusive possession' 
means that the disseizor must show an exclusive 
dominion over the land and an appropriation of 
it to his own use and benefit. Two persons cannot 
hold one iiieee of property adversely to. each 
other at the same time, and where two persons 
have entered upon the land, he who has the better 
title will be deemed to be in possession thereof. 
It is therefore essential that the possession of 
one who claims adversly should establish as an 
ouster of the true owner because in the absence 
of ouster, the title draws to itself the continuous 
possession of the property. Possession not 
amounting to dissl'izin is insufficient. 1 Am 
Jur 875, 87G. 
"Where the possession of land is mixed, the 
legal seisin is according to legal title." Deputron 
v. Yoimg, 13± U.S. 241, 10 S. Ct. 539, 33 L. Ed. 923. 
Because of the :rnperiority Appellants' title, there 
ean he no presumption of possession in Respondents. 
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And the record contains no reference whatsoever to any 
actual possession of the property in controversy by Re-
spondents. The only possible basis for a finding of posses-
sion in Respondents is the well-worn rule that actual 
possession is to be constructively extended to include 
possession of the entire tract for which color of title is 
had. See 3 Am Jur, Adverse Possession, §27. 
But this rule is not applicable to land owned by 
third parties other than that held by the one having 
color of title and his grantor. United Fuel Gas Co. v. 
Dyer, 185 F. 2d 99 (OCA 4th, 1950). 
"Thus where A enters under a deed from B describ-
ing 80 acres of land, but C owns 40 acres of B land, and 
A has no actual possession of any of that part owned 
by C, A's actual possession of a part of B's land will 
not draw to it the constructive possession of the tract 
owned by C even though it is within the limits of the 
boundaries described in the deed to A." 3 Am Jur 24 
Adverse Possession §29. 
It has been stated that to rule otherwise would re-
quire a fee owner of land to seek out and examine the 
color of title to every newcomer taking possession of 
land in the vicinity, less the latter's actual possession be 
constructively extended to destroy the former's title. 
McCoy v. Anthony Land Co., 230 Ark, 244, 322 SW 2d 439. 
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A::; Respondent::; are without either actual O·r con-
structive possession of the land in controversy, the judg-
ment of the trial court cannot be upheld. 
The rule that po::;::;ession of part under color of title 
is vossession of whole cannot prevail where another party 
in possession under a better title. Biiras v. United Gas 
Pipe Line, 127 So. 2d 271. Actual possession must prevail 
over any constructive pos::;ession by another even though 
under color of title. Giddens v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 
218 Ala. 217, 118 So. 383; 2 CJS Adverne Posse::;sion, 
19G (pocket parts). 
POINT II 
THE PARTIES HA VE ACQUIESCED AND AGREED 
THAT THE COUNTY ROAD CONSTITUTES THE 
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE PROP-
ERTIES. 
It is clear that the predecessors in interest of both 
the Appellants and Respondents consider the existing 
county road to be the boundary line between their prop-
erties. The deeds which both received from Maggie B. 
Thompson make it clear that this boundary was to be the 
south side of the existing road. 
Respondents should not now be allowed to question 
this boundary line if the elements of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence are met. The case of Fuoco v. 
Williams, 15 Utah 2d 153, 389 P. 2d 143, ::;eems to clearly 
determine that boundary by acquiescence may be estab-
lished by: 
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a. Occupation up to a visible line. 
b. Acquiescence in that line as a boundary. 
c. For a long period of time. 
d. By adjoining land owners. 
The facts show herein that both parties, and their 
predecessors in interest as well, have occupied up to the 
county road and no more. This occupancy has been con-
sistent since the year 1906. During this period of time, no 
protest has been made that the road was not the true 
boundary. Respondents have fenced their property along 
the road, and the road is clearly visible and has not 
changed its course or position during the period nor has 
there ever been another road between the properties. In 
addition, Appellants have occupied their property up 
to the country road. They have placed signs thereon and 
have fenced certain strategic portions of their property 
to prevent its being used for dumping. 
Boundary by acquiescence can be established without 
an express agreement that the road is to constitute the 
boundary. See Hummel v. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P. 
2d 410. However, in the present case an express condition 
in the original deed has determined that the road would 
constitute the boundary between the properties. A boun· 
dary by acquiescence was clearly established and in· 
tended since 1906, and the road has been treated by the 
parties as the boundary ever since that time. 
In the year 1935 the probate court of Salt Lake 
County purported to change this boundary. Whether it 
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did so intentionally or whetht-r it rnetely tried to eonform 
the south boundary in several deeds to what it thought 
was the legal description of the road is unknown. The 
significant thing is that Appellants predecessors were 
not parties to the probate proceeding. All parties to 
adjoining properties are necessary parties in an action 
to determine the true boundary line between properties. 
Cady c. Kerr, (Wash), 118 P. 2d 182. 
Any decree purporting to change an established 
boundary would necessarily be void if it did not adjudi-
cate the rights of all land owners adjacent to the boun-
dary. It is also clear that owners of adjoining lands who 
occupy their respective premises up to a certain line 
which they mutually recognize as the boundary line for 
a long period of time, cannot deny that the boundary so 
recognized is the true line. Nelson v. DaRouch, 87 Utah 
457, 50 P. 2d 273. The latter case conditions this rule 
upon the boundary being open to observation and marked 
by monuments. In this case, the boundary is a monument 
and has been opened to observation long before 190G 
when the property was first conveyed by Maggie B. 
Thompson. 
And even in an ordinary possession case, possession 
resting upon color of title is restricted where less prop-
erty is claimed than that described in the instrument 
giving color of title. See Pennell v. Brookshire, 193 N.C. 
73, 136 SE 257; 2 CJS, Adverse Po.ssession ~185, Page 
781. 
A claimant may by his own acts restrict his claims 
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within narrower bounds than those delineated in his title 
grant. Lyles v. Fellers, 138 S.C. 31, 136 SE 13; Sturgi0 
v. Hughes, 206 Ark. 946, 178 SW 2d 236. 
Such restriction was present in the instant contro-
versy as Respondents never attempted to take pa.ssession 
of any additional property purported to have been dis. 
tributed by the 1935 decree. Even if this decree doe~ 
give them a color of title, they will not be presumed to 
possess property which they have not attempted to 
possess. In this case, the Respondents' po·ssession is not 
measured by the boundaries of the 1935 decree but only 
by the boundaries of their claim. Respondents' claim has 
never extended south of the county road. 
Appellants submit that the road herein was acquiesc-
ed in as the boundary between their property and the 
property of Respondents. This boundary was fixed long 
before 1935 and the probate court was powerless to 
change it. Appellants further submit that the road con· 
tinued to be viewed as the boundary by all adjoining land 
owners until shortly before the commencement of the 
quiet title action herein and that the decision of the 
Lower Court quieting title in Respondents is not in har· 
mony with established decisions of this Court and there 
fore should be overturned. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN CONTRO-
VERSY COULD BE FOUND IN RESPONDENTS, 
APPELLANTS HOLD TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY 
BY ADVERSE POSSESSION AND TITLE SHOULD 
BE QUIETED IN THEM. 
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While Re8pondent8 cannot adveri::iely claim title to 
the property in question becaui::ie of their inferior title 
and lack of actual po·ssession, Appellants can 8Uccessfully 
acquire title by this means. Assuming, without conceding, 
that the 1935 decree established a north boundary for 
Appellants' property, it ii::i nonethelei::ii::i apparent that 
Appellants have been in actual possession of the property 
in controversy since their acqui8ition thereof in 1955. 
They arc in possession both under a deed granting them 
the property to the south of the county road as well as 
under a tax title ai::i8essing the property up to this i::iame 
monument line. 
Section 78-1~-7.l provides in part: 
" ... [I]f If in any action any party shall 
establish prima-facie evidence that he is the owner 
of any real property under a tax title held by him 
and his predecessors for four years prior to the 
commencement of such action and one year after 
the effective date of this amendment, he shall be 
presumed to be the owner of such property by 
adverse possession unless it appears that the 
owner of the legal title or his predecessor has 
actually occupied or been in possession of such 
property under such title or that such tax title 
owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all 
of the taxes levied or assessed upon such property 
within such four-year period." 
Appellants have paid all of the taxes levied upon the 
property in question and are the owners of the property 
nnder a bona fide tax deed and have been for a period 
of over 8 years. All taxes on the property during this time 
have been paid. Tax notices in the name o·f Appellants 
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describing the property in question have been mailed (1, 
Appellants and have been paid by them. These notic1., 
describe the property in question as bordering along tht 
south side of the county road as far as the north boun 
dary is concerned. 
Section 78-12-5.2 provides in part: 
"No action or defense for the recover or pos-
session of real property or to quiet title or to de-
termine the ownership thereof shall be com-
menced or interposed against the holder of a tax 
title after the expiration of four years from the 
date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of such 
tax title to any county or directly to any other 
purchase (sic) thereof at any public or privatt 
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from 
the date of this act." 
Where, as in the present case, the Appellants have 
been in actual possession of the property in controversy 
and have paid the taxes thereon and hold title thereto 
under a tax title in addition to their warranty deed, it 
appears that the statutory requirements of adverse pos-
session of tax titles have been met and that the title to 
the property should be quieted in Appellants as a matter 
of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Lower Court is not supported 
by the facts and is not in harmony with well established 
decisions of this Court. The Appellants are the owners 
in fee of the property in question and have superior title 
thereto as contrasted to Respondents color of title creat-
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ing an overlap along the north-:south boundary of the 
property in question. The overlap created by the decree 
of the probate court in 1935 cannot control the rights 
of tlrn property a:s far a:;, Appellant:;,' predecessors in 
interest are concerned, and title to the property should 
be quieted in Appellants. The judgment of the Lo.wer 
Court should be overruled. 
Respectfully submitted. 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
F. Burton Howard 
Attorney for Appellants 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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